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ANOREXIA AND THE REFUSAL OF
MEDICAL TREATMENT
Jo Oliver*
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 gives everyone the right to rejuse medical treatment. In Re CMC
the right of an anorexic patient to refuse treatment was overridden by the Family Court,
Anorexia nervosa is recognised as a mental illness which predominantly a#ects women. This
paper considers the philosophical and legal basis for that decision. The writer also touches on
the wider ethical and social issues raised by the decision.
I INTRODUCTION
In the case of Re CMO Judge MacCormick made an order that nasogastric feeding be
administered to a 33 year old anorexic patient (CMC) against her wishes. This was the
first reported judgment in New Zealand on this subject. The application was made by
CMC's husband, under section 10(1)(f) of the Protection of Personal and Property Rights
Act 1988. The judgment also mentions their two children, aged eleven and seven. It was an
application of last resort, since CMC's 20-year illness had become severe and her weight
was so low that her life was in danger. As well as the immediate danger to her life, CMC
had little chance of survival in the long term unless she gained weight.
The decision raises some important issues. Anorexia nervosa has become recognised as
a mental illness which predominantly affects women. The origin of the disease partly lies in
social pressures to conform to an ideal body shape. Although she had anorexia, CMC had a
right to refuse medical treatment which had to be overridden by the court. Her doctors had
an interest in giving her treatment to save her life. Her husband and children had a more
personal interest in keeping her alive and helping her to recover. The State also had an
interest in preserving CMC's life. Re CMC illustrates the conflict of these rights and
interests and one possible resolution of them in the circumstances.
* This paper was submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme.
1 [1995] NZFLR 341.
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This paper will begin in Part I by outlining the reasoning of Judge MacCormick. Part II
goes on to consider the issue of competence to refuse treatment. Part III begins to explore
some of the rights and interests mentioned above. In Part IV the writer concludes that the
decision was the correct one in the circumstances.
II THE DECISION OF IUDGE MACCORMICK
The judgment begins with the basic position on the refusal of medical treatment. At
common law, no treatment may be administered without the patient's consent:2
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
In addition, section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that
"[e]veryone has the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment."
Section 10(1)(f) of the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act (the "PPPR Act") is
a statutory exception to the right to refuse medical treatment. Under this section, the Family
Court has jurisdiction to make an order that a person be provided with medical treatment of
the kind specified in the order. This order overrides any refusal of consent on the part of
the patient.
According to the statute, there are two stages to the decision to grant an order for
medical treatment.3 The first stage is to establish jurisdiction to make an order. The second
stage is an exercise of the court's discretion as to whether to make the order.
The court has jurisdiction to make an order under section 6 when the person:
(a) Lacks, wholly or partly, the capacity to understand the nature, and to foresee the
consequences, of decisions in respect of matters relating to his or her personal care and
welfare; or
(b) Has the capacity to understand the nature, and to foresee the consequences of
decisions in respect of matters relating to his or her personal care and welfare, but
wholly lacks the capacity to communicate decisions in respect of such matters.
Section 5 states that the person is to be presumed competent until proven otherwise.
Further, section 6(3) states that :
(3) The fact that the person in respect of whom the application is made for the exercise
of the Court's jurisdiction has made or is intending to make any decision that a person
2 Schloendoof v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92,93 (1914)
3 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act, s 9.
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exercising ordinary prudence would not have made or would not make given the
same circumstances is not in itself sufficient ground for the exercise of that
jurisdiction by the court.
These provisions reflect the principle that unless a person is proven to lack capacity,
that person should be able to make their own treatment decisions, even if those decisions
seem unreasonable.
In CMC, Judge MacCormick found that CMC lacked capacity in three respects: her
understanding of relevant information, her appreciation of the situation and its
consequences and her ability to follow a logical sequence of thought in order to reach a
decision.4 She did not "understand or appreciate" that her illness was life-threatening. She
"could not perceive" that nasogastric feeding was virtually necessary in order for her to
survive. Her thought process was not logical in that she wanted to survive, but could not
see that she would have to gain weight in order to do so. She tended to blame others for her
situation. All this was due to her anorexia nervosa.5
...she was doing it as a feature of her illness, which is in essence an illness of mental disorder
and lack of rational perception in this area. It is something which I merely note without any
connotation of blame. If she were in her right mind, she would perceive that in fact she has
very considerable control over the situation and that from a rational perspective she has been
enormously manipulative. But it is not to be looked at as if she were able to perceive the
situation rationally - for I am satisfied that she has not been able to. The disorder is
compulsive for her and, in Dr Clarkson's [her psychiatrist's] evidence, overrides absolutely
everything else such as her love for her children, her wish to be fit and well and healthy and
independent again, indeed, her expressed wish to recover.
Once it has been established that the Court has jurisdiction, there is still a discretion as
to whether to make the order.6 According to section 6 of the Act, in exercising this
discretion the primary objectives of the Court are :
(a) To make the least restrictive intervention possible in the life of the person in respect of
whom the application is made, having regard to the degree of that person's
incapacity;
(b) To enable or encourage that person to exercise and develop such capacity as he or she
has to the greatest extent possible.
4 Above n 1, 344.
5 Above n 1, 345.
6 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act, s 9(2).
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The High Court case of In the Matter ofA,7 decided after Re CMC, held that the patient's
"welfare and best interests" is another objective which the court has regard to in exercising
its discretion.
In the context of objectives, forced nasogastric feeding was not seen as an ultimate long
term cure for CMC.8 Rather it was a temporary measure to help CMC overcome her illness.
CMC's psychiatrist stated that:9
It is my opinion that CMC's fear of weight gain is so overwhelming that despite her best
intentions she [is] quite unable to eat enough to gain further weight. It is possible that if she
can be re-fed to a more healthy weight by nasogastric feeding that she will be able to deal with
her fears of weight gain and that her ability to think more rationally about her situation will
improve with better nutrition. It is also my opinion that without nasogastric feeding we will
make no further progress regarding her weight.
In finally granting the order, Judge MacCormick stated:10
Had CMC not expressed a wish to live, to recover fully and to lead a future life with her
family and in particular her children, then in exercising the ultimate discretion it may perhaps
have been appropriate to decline to make the order. But having regard to her stated wishes
(other than those relating to treatment), I was satisfied that the proposed treatment was the
least restrictive supplementary treatment that was available and that it was a form of
treatment which hopefully might enable CMC to ultimately exercise and develop her own
capacity to overcome her illness. In that regard Dr Clarkson remained optimistic that she still
had a good chance of doing so if the initial physical problem could be addressed. It was in
these circumstances that the Court accepted responsibility for making the order sought.
III COMPETENCE TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
A Justification for Providing Medical Treatment to Incompetent Patient
At common law, the right to refuse medical treatment is based on the inviolability of the
body.11 Philosophically, the right is based on the principle of autonomy or self-
determination. The underlying idea is that a decision which is the result of an individual's
free choice is a valuable decision regardless of its actual content. So if an individual freely
7 [1996] NZFLR 359.
8 Above n 1, 343
9 Above n 1, 346.
10 Above n 1, 346.
11 In ref (Mental Patient : Sterilisation) [1989] 2 WLR 1063, 1082.
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makes a choice which we consider to be a bad one, that choice should nevertheless be
respected.
As well as the value of personal autonomy, there is the principle of individual well-
being. In the medical context, this is the idea that any action we take should promote the
patient's physical and mental health. The two principles are linked in that it will usually
promote the patient's well-being to allow her12 to make her own decisions with respect to
medical treatment. This is for two reasons. The first is that, generally, the patient is the best
judge of what is in her own interests. Her best interests may be personal to her in that they
depend on her own values and goals. Secondly, it promotes the patient's emotional well-
being to allow her to make her own decisions about personal matters in her life.
In some situations, the two values of respect for personal autonomy and promotion of
well-being come into conflict. This happens when the patient makes a choice that we think
is not in her best interests, or will not promote her well-being. The issue then becomes the
relative weight to be given to the two conflicting principles.13
Recent developments in the law tend to give more weight, or a presumptive weight, to the
patient's autonomy. The PPPR Act is an example of legislation which focuses on patient
autonomy instead of patemalistic judgments as to what is right for the patient. Under the
Act, a patient is presumed competent until proven otherwise, and no intervention can be
ordered unless there is a finding of incompetence.
So when are we justified in overriding a patient's decision? Following the principle of
respect for autonomy, we may be justified in overriding a patient's refusal of treatment if the
patient has not truly made a (ree choice. Patients who lack decision-making capacity or
competence are not acting with true autonomy when they make decisions.14 Such decisions
are not inherently valuable. Where a patient lacks competence, we are justified in giving
greater weight to the promotion of her well-being than to her personal autonomy. In such
situations we need to protect the patient from her own harmful decisions.
Even if intervention is justified, personal autonomy should still be respected. In order to
do this, any intervention should be the minimum necessary to promote the patient's
12 The patient is referred to in the feminine gender throughout this paper, since anorexia patients
are predominantly female.
13 This analysis of the principle o f autonomy and the principle of well-being is taken from AE
Buchanan and DW Brock Deciding for Others - The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 29-41.
14 I Kennedy and A Grubb Medical Law - Texts and Materials (2 ed) (Butterworths, London, 1989)
202.
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interests.15 Excessive intervention would go beyond the limits of the justification. This
idea is reflected in the PPPR Act in section 8(a), which states that any intervention should
be the least restrictive possible having regard to the degree of the patient's incapacity.
The type of treatment should also reflect the principle of autonomy. For example, the
treatment given could be one which it is thought the patient would choose if competent. This
means that the patient's personal values and goals, if known, can be promoted. With
temporarily incompetent patients, the goal of intervention could be to promote the patient's
autonomy in the long term.16 The medical treatment is then justified as a means of bringing
the patient to a state of true autonomy. This is reflected in the PPPR Act in section 8(b),
which states that an objective of treatment is to help the patient to develop her future
capacity to make decisions.
B Oiteria for Competence
Since the justification for imposing treatment without the patient's consent is based on
incompetence, the determination of competence is a central issue. One writer has stated that
the question of what the criteria for competence are has generally been ignored by
lawyers.17 Until recently, no English judgment had directly addressed the issue.18 Courts
have tended to rely on psychiatric evidence. This is a mistake since an assessment of
competence involves social and legal factors as well as medical ones.19
Under the PPPR Act, there is some statutory guidance as to what constitutes
incompetence. The section 6 test is that the patient "[1]acks, wholly or partly, the capacity to
understand the nature, and to foresee the consequences, of decisions in respect of matters
relating to his or her personal care and welfare".
The incapacity is stated to be with respect to decisions relating to personal care and
welfare. In CMC, and similar cases, the decisions concerned are decisions with respect to
medical treatment. So a person is not found competent or incompetent in general, but only
incompetent with respect to certain decisions.20 For example, an intellectually handicapped
person may be perfectly competent to decide what to eat for lunch, and that decision ought to
15 Above n 14, 293.
16 Above n 14, 204.
17 M Brazier "Competence, Consent and Proxy Consents" in M Brazier and M Lobjoit (eds)
Protecting the Vulnerable - Autonomy and Consent in Health Care (Routledge, London, 1991) 48.
18 The recent case of Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819 does address the
ISSUe.
19 Above n 14, 196.
20 Butterworths Family Law Service (Butterworths, Wellington, 1995) 7809-7810.
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be respected. However, he may be incompetent to enter into a mortgage transaction because
he has no understanding of the concept of legal obligation or of the long term future.21
What does it mean to lack the capacity to "understand the nature and foresee the
consequences" of a decision? The statutory words follow the common law test used by
English courts, that a patient must "understand the nature, purpose and effects" of
treatment.22 So in interpreting the PPPR Act test, general common law criteria for
competence are relevant.
Some very basic requirements for competence are an ability to focus attention on what is
said, an ability to listen and an adequate memory.23 There is no doubt that CMC met these
very basic criteria. Another basic criterion is the ability to communicate decisions. Under
the PPPR Act, if a person wholly lacks this ability, the patient is deemed incompetent for the
purposes of section 6(b). Again, there was no question that CMC lacked any ability to
communicate.
It is necessary to consider some more sophisticated criteria for competence. In Re CMC
Judge MacCormick made use of three factors24 which were identified in the earlier case of In
the matter of FT:25
(1) understanding of relevant information
(2) appreciation of the situation and its consequences
(3) ability to follow a logical sequence of thought in order to reach a decision.
In Re C,26 a decision in the Family Division in England, the following three stages to a
decision about medical treatment were identified and applied:27
(1) to take in and retain treatment information
(2) to believe it
(3) to weigh the information, balancing risks and needs.
21 1 Dawson The Implementation of the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 : the Report of
a Pilot Study in Dunedin (Bioethics Research Centre of the University of Otago, Dunedin, 1994) 63.
22 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432; Re C, above n 18.
23 B James "The Disabled and the Law" (1990) 2 FLB 62.
24 Above n 1, 344.
25 Unreported, 11 January 1995, District Court, Auckland Registry, PPPR 68/94.
26 Above n 18.
2 7 Above n 18, 822, 824.
628 (1997) 27 VUWLR
This three stage test has been accepted as useful by academics,28 and is similar to the
approach recommended by the English Law Commission.29 The three stages correspond
roughly to the three factors applied in Re CMC. Stage (1) is a basic test of understanding or
cognitive skills. Stage (2) tests whether the patient appreciates the significance of the
information, or its reality. Stage (3) tests whether the patient can piece the information
together in order to reach a decision. Some writers include a fourth criterion - a set of
values or conception of what is good. This can be subsumed under (3). The process of
weighing the information involves evaluating particular outcomes as good or bad according
to the patient's value system.
C Reasonableness of the Decision to Refuse Treatment
It is not part of the criteria that the decision actually reached be reasonable. There is a
temptation, when a patient makes a decision that seems unreasonable, to think that the
patient must be incompetent. This temptation should be resisted, because it fails to respect
the patient's autonomy and imposes the judgment of the doctor, or society as to what is
reasonable. In effect, it looks at the outcome of the patient's decision-making and finds it
defective. This means that those who have different or unusual value systems can be found
incompetent.
The criteria above focus instead on the process of decision-making. If the process is
defective, then intervention is justified. The PPPR Act recognises this problem, and section
6(3) states that a patient cannot be declared incompetent merely because the decision is not
one that a person of "ordinary prudence" would make.
This right to make unreasonable decisions was affirmed in the English Court of Appeal
in the case of Re T.31 In that case, the patient refused consent to a blood transfusion because
of her Jehovah's Witness faith. The Court made it clear that "an adult person of sound mind"
has an absolute right to refuse medical treatment, even if that refusal is unreasonable in the
circumstances, and even if it will probably lead to the patient's death.32 This is an example
of the value of autonomy being placed more highly then the promotion of the patient's
28 K Stern "Competence to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment" [1994] 1 FLR 31. The test
was approved in Home Secretary u Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677, 681. A similar three stage test was
approved by Kennedy and Grubb, above n 14, 198, 215 and Buchanan and Brock, above n 13, 23-
25.
29 Above n 18, 824.
30 Buchanan and Brock, above n 13, 23-25; President's Commission in Kennedy & Grubb, above n
14,198.
31 [1992] 3 WLR 782.
3 2 Above n 31, 786-787.
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physical well-being. It may be thought that her emotional or spiritual well-being would
suffer more if treatment was imposed.
It is important to see that a person who refuses medical treatment on religious grounds
can be competent, although her decision seems unreasonable. A Jehovah's Witness patient
who refuses a blood transfusion typically does so because of the belief that having
another's blood in one's body is like taking another's soul. The result of a blood
transfusion is that the person will not achieve eternal life. The Jehovah's Witness patient
may believe that it is better to die from refusing a blood transfusion than to accept one and
live contrary to the faith. This seems unreasonable to many of us because we do not share
these beliefs.
Consider a Jehovah's Witness patient against the three criteria for competence listed
above. The Jehovah's Witness understands that the blood transfusion is to replace lost
blood, and believes that she may die without the transfusion. She weighs the information,
and decides that it is better to refuse the transfusion. So although the criteria require her to
balance risks and needs, we cannot tell her what weight to place on the various factors.
She cannot be held incompetent for failing to place the "correct" weight on the risk of dying.
Further, she is following a logical sequence of thought. If she accepts the transfusion, she
will suffer eternal damnation. In these circumstances, it is logical for her to refuse the
transfusion. She has freely made the choice to have this value system, and she is now freely
choosing to follow it.
Despite this pronouncement of the right to make unreasonable decisions, the fact remains
that in practice, many decisions are judged according to whether they are reasonable.
According to some writers, competence tends to be judged on the risk-benefit ratio of the
particular treatment.33 So if a particular treatment has little or no risk, and would benefit
the patient by saving their life, a patient who refuses this treatment would tend to be held
incompetent. In effect, this means that the more the patient's physical well-being is in danger,
the less weight is given to personal autonomy.
This argument is supported by case law. Courts are extremely reluctant to allow
someone to die when a low-risk treatment is available.34 So in Re L although the patient
was generally competent, the court found that at the time of making the decision, she was
physically and emotionally weak and so prone to the influence of her mother.35 This
justified setting aside her decision.
33 Roth, Meisel and Lidz in Kennedy & Grubb, above n 14, 195; M Nicholls "Consent to Medical
Treatment" [1993] Family Law 30, 32.
34 K Stern, above n 28,542.
35 Above n 31, 794-795.
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These factors should be borne in mind when considering Re CMC. CMC refused
nasogastric feeding. Although the treatment was not guaranteed to save her life, medical
evidence indicated she would die without it. The treatment itself was not risky. Most
people would consider her decision an unreasonable one. The question remains whether
the case is an example of society imposing its judgment as to what is reasonable and in
CMC's best interests. The key to this lies in the link between CMC's mental illness and her
refusal of treatment.
D CMC, Anorexia Neruosa and Competence
CMC had suffered from anorexia nervosa for 20 years, and her illness had been severe
for seven years. Anorexia nervosa is a recognised mental illness. However, a diagnosis of
anorexia is not enough to prove that CMC is incompetent for the purposes of the PPPR Act.
What must be proven is that CMC lacked capacity according to the criteria set out above. It
is therefore necessary to show how CMC's mental illness affected her capacity.
The link between a person's mental illness and competence to make decisions was
considered in Re C.36 C was a 68 year old patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
He developed gangrene in his foot, and his condition worsened to the extent that he was
likely to die imminently unless his foot was amputated. C refused consent to the amputation,
although he consented to other medical treatment.
The issue was C's competence to consent. C had some strange beliefs, including the belief
that he was a world famous doctor and the belief that he was being persecuted. Thorpe J
found that C's refusal of treatment was not a result of his mental illness. C's refusal was
simply a result of his ordinary value judgment that it would be better to die with two feet
than to live with one. With respect to the decision not to amputate, C passed all three stages
of the competence test.
So how does anorexia affect a person's competence? Anorexia nervosa is an eating
disorder, so primarily it affects a person's eating habits.37 Anorexics are generally
obsessed with food and dieting, and afraid of gaining weight. Their fear of weight gain
causes them to become manipulative and deceitful in order to avoid eating without arousing
the suspicion of others. Anorexics behave compulsively. Their urge to diet is beyond their
control.
Another feature of anorexia relates to control. Many anorexics have grown up feeling
that they were not in control of important aspects of their lives. The development of an
36 Above n 18.
37 This summary of anorexia is taken from an interview with Jane Scott, psychologist at the Child
and Family Clinic, Lower Hutt.
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anorexic's illness can often be traced to a subconscious desire to control her environment.
The most obvious manifestation of this is the obsessive need to control her food intake.
This desire to be in control means that anorexics want to deal with the illness by
themselves. They see medical intervention as a threat to their control. Forced nasogastric
feeding, then, is an extreme form of loss of control for an anorexic patient. Further,
anorexics' fear of weight gain means that they routinely refuse artificial feeding. So special
considerations apply to anorexia when considering the issue of competence to refuse
treatment.
The fact that anorexia affects mainly women suggests that other special considerations
may apply. The psychological cause of anorexia is often low self esteem, sometimes caused
by society's perceptions of how a woman should look. Therefore it is important to
distinguish behaviours stemming from low self esteem from the mental disorder that is
anorexia nervosa.
E Anorexia Nervosa and Criteria for Competence
The three criteria for competence are
(1) ability to understand information
(2) ability to appreciate situation and consequences / believe the information
(3) ability to follow logical sequence of thought in order to reach a decision.
In this context, the decision is to refuse nasogastric feeding for anorexia, and the
information is the medical information relating to CMC's prognosis.
In Re CMC Judge MacCormick found that CMC failed all three stages of the test, due to
her anorexia.38 In his words, she did not "understand or appreciate" the threat to her life,
because she could not "bring herself to understand it". She also did not have the facility to
consider the matter logically, since although she wanted to live, she "could not see" what
was necessary in order for this to be achieved. She could not "perceive the situation
rationally".
It is submitted, with respect, that CMC and anorexic patients generally, do not fail the
test at step (1) "understanding", but at step (2) or (3),39 It is possible to distinguish two
types of defect in a patient's decision-making.40 One is misunderstanding about the nature
and likelihood of the outcome of treatment. This is generally associated with either a lack
38 Above n 1, 344-345.
39 Jane Scott confirmed this. See also K Stern, above n 28,544.
40 Above n 13, 56.
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of information, or a limit in cognitive understanding. The other possible defect is where the
patient's choice fails to reflect her underlying aims and values.
On this analysis, step (1) is a fairly basic test.41 It is submitted that CMC passed step (1)
of the test. She understood what nasogastric feeding was, and why it was being
recommended to her. She understood that its purpose was to help her increase her weight.
She understood the concepts involved.
At stage (2), it is more difficult to say whether CMC "understood" that her illness was
life-threatening. Judge MacCormick found that she did not believe that she was close to
death, or that refusing treatment would threaten her life even further. The issue that arises
is whether CMC knew deep down that her life was in danger, and refused treatment
anyway because of her overriding fear of weight gain, or whether she genuinely did not
believe that she would die because her illness caused her to distort the information. The
literature on anorexia2 is not decisive on this point. It appears to depend on the individual
case as to whether the anorexic patient believes or accepts that her illness is life-
threatening. Generally, she will deny this, at least outwardly. So CMC probably did fail
step (2) of the competence test.
At stage (3), CMC was unable to think logically because her illness was compulsive.
She wanted to live, but compulsively refused food and treatment. This distinguishes her
from the Jehovah's Witness patient who freely chooses to value her faith above her life. It
also distinguishes her from C, who would rather die than have an amputation. CMC's
decision to refuse food was not a free decision to value being thin over being alive. Her
mental illness meant that she had a compulsive fear of gaining weight, and of losing control,
which overrode everything else. Her refusal was not the result of her ordinary beliefs, it
was the result of her mental illness.
It is useful to compare this analysis of anorexia and competence with the discussion in
two recent English cases. The first is Re W.43 This case, in the English Court of Appeal,
concerned the right of a 16 year old anorexic patient to refuse treatment. The issue in the
case was whether, as a 16 year old minor, W had an absolute right to refuse medical
treatment. The result was that she did not have this right. If she refused medical treatment,
consent could be obtained from a parent or from the court.
41 M Brazier, above n 17,36.
42 AH Crisp Anorexia Neruosa - Let Me Be (Academic Press, London, 1980) 149; IL Mintz
"Psychoanalytic Description : The Clinical Picture of Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia" in CP
Wilson, IL Mintz, CC Hogan (eds) Fear Of Being Fat (Jason Aranson Inc, London, 1987) 85; MS
Palazzoli Self Starvation Oason Aranson, London, 1986) 82.
43 [1992] 4 All ER 627.
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W's actual competence to consent, and how her anorexia affected this, was not an issue
on appeal. However, some of the obiter comments are useful. At first instance, the judge had
found that W was competent to make treatment decisions. However, two of the judges on
appeal expressed the view that she was in fact incompetent due to her anorexia. Counsel
conceded during the case that it is a feature of anorexia that it "is capable of destroying the
ability to make an informed choice". Lord Donaldson stated that it creates a compulsion to
refuse effective treatment, and a firm wish not to be cured unless and until the sufferer
wishes to cure herself.44 Balcombe U also referred to the effect of anorexia on the ability to
make an informed choice.45 The judges' comments indicate that they thought W failed stage
three of the competence test. They indicate elsewhere'6 that W is intelligent and quite
capable of understanding the situation. Lord Donaldson also noted that it did not seem to
have occurred to W that she might "leave it too late", ie that she might die if she refused
treatment. This indicates that she may have failed the test at the second stage also.
Another recent English case is South West Hertfordshire Health Authority u KB.47 The
anorexic patient, KB, did not appreciate the situation she was in. She saw "the prospect of
death as a long-term or theoretical prospect".48 Ewbank J distinguished her situation from
that of C, the paranoid schizophrenic.49 Unlike C K's refusal was a result of her mental
illness.
F Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992
The PPPR Act provides a framework in which to judge a patient's competence to consent,
and to impose treatment if the patient is found to be incompetent. Another framework for
this is the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (referred to
throughout this paper as the "MH Act").
In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick stated that:
Anorexia nervosa is, of course, a disorder of the mind and patients with the disease in a
sufficient state of severity have been considered to be mentally disordered in terms of the
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. Some have been held to
require a compulsory treatment order under that Act.
44 Above n 43,630.
45 Above n 43,640.
4 6 Above n 43,637.
4 7 [1994] 2 FCR 1051.
48 Above n 47, 1052.
49 Above n 47,1054.
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The MH Act could have been invoked in Re CMC. The Act has been used, in rare cases,
to force-feed anorexic patients. Re CMC appears to be the first case where the PPPR Act
was used for this purpose. This raises the question of why the PPPR Act was used in
CMC's case.
The key definition in the MH Act is that of "mental disorder":50
"Mental disorder", in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of mind (whether of a
continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or
perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it - (a) poses a serious danger to the
health or safety of that person or of others; or (b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that
person to take care of himself or herself; - and "mentally disordered", in relation to any such
person, has a corresponding meaning:
The definition has two limbs. The first limb requires an "abnormal state of mind",
characterised by certain phenomena. The second limb specifies outcomes of that state of
mind. So the abnormal state of mind itself is not enough, the outcomes must be present before
intervention is justified.
In terms of the first limb, anorexia gives rise to an abnormal state of mind, characterised
by "disorders of ... volition". A disorder of volition is something which affects a person's
choice and / or control of their behaviour.51 So anorexia affects a person's ability to
choose to eat properly, and her ability to control her eating habits.
In terms of the second limb, anorexic patients whose illness is sufficiently severe pose a
serious danger to their own health, and have a seriously diminished capacity to take care of
themselves. This explains Judge MacCormick's comment that only patients with anorexia
"in a sufficient state of severity" are "mentally disordered" within the Act.
Under the MH Act, there are two basic stages to the process of compulsory assessment
and treatment. The first is a period of initial assessment and treatment which can last as
long as a month.52 This period begins when a medical practitioner, usually a psychiatrist,
decides that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is "mentally
50 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2.
51 J Anderson "Psychiatric Decision-making in the Compulsory Assessment Process" in The Mental
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (NZLS, Wellington, 1992) 56.
52 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 10-14.
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disordered".53 During this period, the patient is "required to accept such treatment for
mental disorder" as the psychiatrist directs.54
The second stage is reached when a court grants an application for a compulsory
treatment order (CTO).55 Before granting the order, the court must be satisfied that the
person is mentally disordered. During the first month of a CTO, the patient is again
required to accept the treatment for mental disorder which the psychiatrist recommends.56
Once one month has passed since the granting of the CTO, treatment cannot be
administered without the patient's consent, unless a second psychiatrist approves the
treatment as being in the patient's interests.57 This requirement of a second opinion can be
overridden if treatment is necessary to save the patient's life or to prevent serious damage to
the health of the patient.58
G The PPPR Act and the Mental Health Legislation
Given that the Mental Health Act framework is available, why use the PPPR Act in this
situation? In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick stated that:59
Mr C [CMC's husband] was advised that an application under the Protection of Personal and
Property Rights Act was in fact a less intrusive application than one under the Mental Health
Act....
Although an order under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act is probably not as
far reaching in its effect as a compulsory treatment order under the Mental Health Act, it is
nevertheless, in my view, just as difficult to obtain.
There is a stigma associated with becoming a compulsory patient under the Mental
Health Act. CMC wanted to avoid the stigma of "committal proceedings", and this appears
to be a major reason why the application was made under the PPPR Act.60 This stigma was
also mentioned by Lord Donaldson in Re W, the English case of the 16 year old anorexic.
53 Above n 52, s 10(1)(b).
54 Above n 52, s 58.
55 Above n 52, ss 18-27.
56 Above n 52, s 59(1).
57 Above n 52, s 59(2)
5 8 Above n 52, s 62.
59 Above n 1, 343.
60 Above n 1, 343.
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He stated that the English Mental Health Act probably did not apply to W, but that even if
it did, it would be better to secure treatment on some other basis:61
Although mental illness should not be regarded as any different from physical illness, it is not
always so viewed by the uninformed and the fact that in later life it might become known
that a minor has been treated under the [Mental Health] Acts might rebound to his or her
disadvantage.
Apart from the general stigma of being a mental patient, it is clear that the MH Act
authorises far more intervention than the PPPR Act. Judge MacCormick's observation that a
PPPR Act application is less intrusive2 than a MH Act one is correct in several respects.
First, under the MH Act treatment may be imposed without the patient's consent on the
approval of one psychiatrist. This can continue for a month before an application is made
to court. The approval of a second psychiatrist is not required until after the first month of
the CTO. No second opinion is required where the patient's life is in danger, as it would be
where nasogastric feeding is imposed for anorexia. In contrast, under the PPPR Act a court
order is required before treatment can go ahead. This means that the patient's case is subject
to scrutiny by an independent body.
There are situations where it is particularly desirable to obtain a court order before
proceeding with treatment. An example is the New Zealand case of Re W.63 W was a 74
year old patient who was already subject to a CTO under the MH Act, for severe
depression. He was not eating, and medical evidence indicated that if he did not receive
treatment urgently, he would die within a few days. The proposed treatment was electro-
convulsive therapy (ECT). This was accepted to be the only available option, but it carried
substantial risk to W. W was incapable of giving consent, so the treatment could be given
under the MH Act only if a second psychiatrist recommended it as in W's interests. Because
of the high risk involved in treatment, it was not possible or desirable for a psychiatrist to
do this. W's own psychiatrist had applied to the court because she did not want to be
responsible if W's death resulted from treatment. This was a case where an order by an
independent court was appropriate. In granting the order under the PPPR Act, Judge
Boshier stated that it was a "good illustration [of] the way in which the two Acts are
capable of intertwining to provide clear guidelines in cases where there is demonstrable
61 Above n 43, 639.
62 In the matter of IMT [1994] NZFLR 612, alternative applications were made under the PPPR Act
and The Mental Health Act. Judge Green granted the PPPR Act application because it was "less
intrusive" to the patient's rights.
6 3 (1994) 12 FRNZ 573.
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risk".64 It is submitted with respect that the relation between the two Acts is far from
"clear".
There may be situations where a court order is not appropriate. The obvious one is a
case of emergency, where the delay of court proceedings may present a problem. However,
in emergency situations courts are willing to speed up the process. CMC itself was an
urgently scheduled hearing. Another consideration with court proceedings is the stress
which may be caused to the patient by litigation.65
As well as requiring a court order, the PPPR Act is less intrusive in other substantive
respects. Each order for medical treatment under the PPPR Act requires a finding that the
patient is incompetent to make that particular decision. Only then does the patient lose her
right to refuse treatment. In contrast, a patient under the MH Act loses her right to refuse
when she is declared to be "mentally disordered" by a psychiatrist and later by the court.
There is no assessment of her competence to make individual decisions. In this way, it may
be more difficult to obtain an order under the PPPR Act, not "just as difficult" as Judge
MacCormick states.
The PPPR Act is also less intrusive in the types of treatment which it allows. The
treatment is that specified in the court order, which must be the least restrictive possible,
and designed to encourage the patient to develop her future capacity. Under the MH Act, a
psychiatrist is authorised to give any medical treatment for mental disorder. This is for the
discretion of the psychiatrist. There are no principles in the MH Act to guide the
psychiatrist's choice of treatment. This is what Judge MacCormick referred to when he said
that an order under the PPPR Act is not as "far reaching" as one under the MH Act.
Although the MH Act authorises any treatment for mental disorder, it authorises only
medical treatment for mental disorder. So when a patient is subject to compulsory treatment
under the MH Act, it may still be necessary to obtain an order under the PPPR Act for
medical treatment for a physical problem. This occurred in Re W,66 where an unstable
mentally disordered patient was refusing the medical treatment necessary for the safe
delivery of her baby.
H Nasogastric Feeding as a Treatment for Anorexia Neruosa
Since the MH Act has been used in New Zealand for nasogastric feeding of anorexic
patients, it must be assumed that those involved have seen no problem with this treatment
6 4 Above n 63,575.
65 M Mulholland "Re W: Autonomy, Consent and the Anorexic Teenager" (1993) 9 Professional
Negligence 21, 24.
66 (1993) 11 FRNZ 108.
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fitting the description of "medical treatment for mental disorder". This may be because the
position is now settled in England.
There was initially doubt in England as to whether this treatment was medical
treatment for mental disorder within the English Mental Health Act.67 The first difficulty
was in regarding nasogastric feeding as "medical treatment" at all, since all it does is
provide the patient with artificial nutrition. This was settled in 1993 when the House of
Lords held that nasogastric feeding is medical treatment.68
The more difficult issue is whether nasogastric feeding can be described as treatment for
a mental disorder. If a mental disorder causes someone to refuse food, then nasogastric
feeding treats the physical symptoms, but does not directly treat the underlying mental
disorder.69 Directly treating the mental disorder generally involves psychotherapy.
This issue was addressed in England in the Family Division in South West Hertfordshire
Health Authority v KB.m In that case, Ewbank J accepted counsel's argument that:71
anorexia nervosa...is an eating disorder and relieving the symptoms is just as much a part of
treatment as relieving the underlying cause. The symptoms are exacerbated by the patient's
refusal to eat and drink, the mental disorder becomes progressively more and more difficult to
treat and so the treatment by naso-gastric tube is an integral part of the treatment of the
mental disorder itself....the treatment is necessary in order to make psychiatric treatment of
the underlying cause possible at all.
This reasoning was endorsed by Hoffmann U in the English Court of Appeal in B v
Croydon Health Authority.72 In the Croydon case, nasogastric feeding was endorsed as
treatment for a psychopathic disorder. This shows that the reasoning extends beyond
eating disorders.
So whether nasogastric feeding of an anorexic is medical treatment for mental disorder
depends on the purpose of nasogastric feeding. If there was no proposed treatment for the
anorexia, and the feeding was simply to keep the patient alive, then strictly it would not be
authorised by the UK Mental Health Act.73 There are no relevant differences in the New
67 P Fennell "Force Feeding and the Mental Health Act 1983" (1995) 145 New Law Journal 319.
68 Airedale NHS Trust u Bland [1993] AC 789.
69 This problem was considered in B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 1 All ER 683, 687.
70 Above n 47.
71 Aboven 47, 1053.
72 Above n 69.
73 Above n 69,687.
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Zealand MH Act which indicate that a different approach should be taken in this country.
The feeding must be part of, or a prerequisite to, treatment for anorexia.
Nasogastric feeding is imposed only where the patient's life is in danger. A
psychologist74 I spoke to characterised the treatment as one designed primarily to save the
patient's life. This is a prerequisite for treatment for anorexia in the loose sense that
treatment is not possible if the patient is dead.
In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick said that the purpose of treatment was to get CMC to a
physical condition where she could think rationally about her situation and "address
issues necessary for her to recover'*.75 Under the PPPR Act, the court can order any medical
treatment, not just treatment "for mental disorder". However, the Judge's statement shows
that he characterised the feeding as a prerequisite to psychiatric treatment for anorexia.
It is submitted, with respect, that the basis on which the English decisions declared
nasogastric feeding for anorexia to be "medical treatment for mental disorder" is
questionable. The issue did not arise in Re CMC, but it is likely that a New Zealand court
would follow the reasoning of the English cases. It is interesting to note that in England,
there is no alternative statutory procedure such as the PPPR Act in New Zealand.
There are some remaining issues relating to nasogastric feeding as a treatment for
anorexia. Writers on anorexia are agreed that nasogastric feeding should be imposed only
in cases where the patient's life is at risk.76 The problem with imposed feeding is that it
tends to "reconfirm anorexics' earlier experiences of life"77 in that it deprives them of any
control over their situation. This can result in the patient becoming even more
uncooperative. The psychological damage caused by imposed feeding can create further
deterioration in the patient's mental condition. The weight gain caused by imposed feeding
may cause her to panic and attempt to lose even more weight once the feeding is over. Forced
nasogastric feeding then, is an absolute last resort. There is little doubt that this was the
case in Re CMC.
We can now return to the question of whether the MH Act is a more appropriate
framework for the imposition of nasogastric feeding for anorexia than the PPPR Act. The
74 Jane Scott.
75 Above n 1, 343, 345-346.
76 AH Crisp in Anorexia Nervosa - Let Me Be, above n 42,95; IL Mintz in "Psychoanalytic Description:
The Clinical Picture of Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia", above n 42, 214; MS Palazzoli in Self
Starvation, above n 42, 99-103; S Gilbert in Pathology of Eating (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1986) 133.
77 AH Crisp Anorexia Nervosa - Let Me Be, above n 42,97,
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main argument in favour of the MH Act is that it allows psychiatrists to get on with their
job without having to resort to the court, especially where treatment is administered over an
extended period. One writer argues that this is important because lawyers and judges do
not understand what really happens with psychiatric patients, and attempts to promote
their right to refuse treatment are "damaging to patients and destructive of treatment
planning".78
If this is simply an argument that psychiatrists know what is best for patients, the
answer is that psychiatric patients have rights and they are entitled to have those rights
upheld by a court.
If it is an argument about the inconvenience of obtaining a court order, this argument is
not convincing in the case of nasogastric feeding for anorexia. The order in CMC was for
feeding to be administered if necessary, over the period of a year. Since the treatment is an
emergency one only, it is unlikely that a further order would be required after this period
expired. If, due to the chronic nature of CMC's condition, a further order was required, it is
submitted that it is not unduly onerous to require an application after a year. Psychiatrists
are still responsible for deciding whether to make an application, and once the application
is granted, whether and how often to impose feeding.
Given that avoidance of court proceedings is the only reason for using the MH Act, it is
submitted that it is desirable to use the PPPR Act so that the patient has the protection of a
court order. The imposition of medical treatment without consent is a serious undermining
of the patient's personal rights. Mentally ill patients are inherently more vulnerable than
others and perhaps more in need of the court's protection. It is desirable for a court to
balance the various interests and considerations involved. The issue is not just a medical
one, it is social and legal as well, which makes a court order appropriate.
Despite this, it is not clear from the judgment in Re CMC why CMC's case was dealt with
in this way when other applications had been brought under the MH Act. It remains to be
seen whether the PPPR Act will be used for these situations in future.
IV THE DISCRETION
According to section 9 of the PPPR Act, a finding of incompetence gives the court
jurisdiction to make an order under that Act. The next step is for the court to exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to grant the order. The objectives of the court in the exercise
of its discretion are contained in section 8: to make the least restrictive intervention
possible and to encourage the patient to develop her future capacity.
78 L McGarry and P Chodoff "The Ethics of Involuntary Hospitalisation" in Psychiatric Ethics
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981) 217.
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In Re "Tony",79 the judge expressed the opinion that the section 8 objectives are relevant
to the finding of jurisdiction as well as discretion. This was because:80
the issue of any shortfall in capacity or competence is not easily separated from consideration
of the degree of intervention (if any) that may be required to make up for that shortfall ... the
applicant may need to show not only an impairment in ... competence, but that the effect of
that impairment is such that intervention is necessary.
The later case of R v C1 rejected this approach, stating that the legislation clearly
contemplated a two stage process, the first stage being a pure competence test.
Perhaps the differences between the two approaches would not amount to very much in
practice. The approach in Re "Tony" would involve consideration of social factors in
determining the issue of competence. The writer has already stated that these other factors
usually come in to a decision about competence, whether this is expressly admitted or not.
Further, with orders for medical treatment jurisdiction is always determined with reference
to a particular treatment or course of action. In this way, it is difficult to separate the
intervention issue from the competence issue.
In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick treated the issues of jurisdiction and discretion
separately. In exercising his discretion, the Judge stated that:82
Had CMC not expressed a wish to live, to recover fully and to lead a future life with her
family and in particular her children, then in exercising the ultimate discretion it may perhaps
have been appropriate to decline to make the order. But having regard to her stated wishes
(other than those relating to treatment), I was satisfied that the proposed treatment was the
least restrictive supplementary treatment that was available and that it was a form of
treatment which hopefully might enable CMC to ultimately exercise and develop her own
capacity to overcome her illness.
The Judge is obviously making reference here to the section 8 objectives. However, his
comments go beyond these objectives in some respects. This is justified since the objectives
are not strict rules, they are the primary objectives only. There still remains a discretion to
take other factors into account. The following is an analysis of some of the other factors
which Judge MacCormick appeared to consider in CMC's case.
79 (1990) 5 NZFLR 609.
80 Above n 79, 615.
81 [1992] NZFLR 162, 165-166.
82 Above n 1, 346.
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A The Sanctity of Life, CMC's Wish to Live and CMC's Best Interests
The Judge comments that if CMC had not expressed a wish to live, he may have declined
to make the order for her medical treatment. It is necessary to consider the possible basis for
such a decision.
It is recognised that the state has an interest in preserving life. This takes the form of an
interest in preserving the life of the particular patient, and an interest in preserving the
sanctity of all life. This abstract interest does not generally justify overriding an
individual's right to refuse medical treatment. The patient has a much stronger personal
interest in directing the course of her own life.83
Despite this respect for autonomy, courts are very reluctant to allow a patient to die and
will go to great lengths to prevent this. When the result of a patient's refusal is likely to be
death, the court can use the tool of competence to achieve the desired result. It was stated
earlier that where a decision to refuse treatment will result in death, and treatment carries
little risk, there is usually a finding that the patient is incompetent in some way.
In Re CMC, there was no need to distort the concept of competence. CMC was clearly
incompetent to make decisions regarding her medical treatment. This appears to justify the
court's intervention to take measures to keep her alive. Does the court's intervention really
depend on CMC's "wish to live"?
The emphasis on CMC's wishes can perhaps be attributed to a respect for autonomy.
However, it could hardly be supposed that she was competent to make a decision as to
whether or not she wanted to live. If she had expressed a wish to die, this decision would
not have been respected because CMC was not competent to make it.
Perhaps the Judge is referring to the principles in section 8. He states that, given her
wish to live, the treatment is the least restrictive possible and one designed to encourage her
to develop her future capacity. With respect to the principle of encouragement, perhaps if
the treatment is to achieve this, CMC must have a desire to live. If CMC is not interested in
recovery, nasogastric feeding can only be a measure to keep her alive. She can only develop
her future capacity by overcoming her anorexia, and the initiative for this must come from
her.
Is forced nasogastric feeding the "least restrictive intervention'*? This is supposed to be
judged according to "the degree of the subject person's incapacity". Judge MacCormick
considers "least restrictive" with reference to CMC's wishes and her physical condition, not
the degree of her incapacity. Nasogastric feeding appears to be the least restrictive
alternative consistent with her living, because of her physical state. She wants to live,
8 3 Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209 (1985).
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therefore nasogastric feeding is the least restrictive alternative consistent with her wishes.
It is significant that Judge MacCormick does not mention the least restrictive intervention,
but the least restrictive supplementary treatment. The point is simply that the least
restrictive alternative must be judged against some goal or other, not just the degree of the
person's incapacity. Here the goal was CMC's survival and recovery.
A similar approach was taken in the PPPR case of Re W.84 In that case the patient was
74 years old and was refusing food due to severe depression. Without the recommended
treatment, he would die within a few days. Like CMC, he was incompetent to give consent
but expressed a wish to live. Unlike CMC, he was not refusing treatment. The judge
accepted counsel's argument that one of W's personal rights protected by the PPPR Act, was
his "personal right to live". Since W had expressed a wish to live but was unable to change
the course of events himself, there was a duty on the part of the court to promote his
personal right to live. The recommended treatment was extremely risky, but was held to be
the least restrictive alternative since it was the only treatment that had a chance of keeping
W alive.
This analysis is confirmed by the judgment in In the Matter of AP a recent High Court
decision under the PPPR Act. Counsel in that case argued that "least restrictive
intervention" must be read as the least restrictive intervention possible to ensure that the
person's welfare and best interests are cared for. This argument was effectively accepted by
the court. This shows that the least restrictive intervention should be judged, according to
the High Court, against the welfare and best interests of the patient.
In the Matter of A holds that "welfare and best interests" is a hidden objective of the
PPPR Act, in addition to those stated in section 8. According to the High Court, the purpose
of the Act is clearly concerned with welfare and best interests, and to deny this is to play
with words. It is likely that part of the real motivation for the decision in Re CMC was the
Judge's feeling that nasogastric feeding was in CMC's best interests.
The danger with a best interests approach is that society will impose its judgment as to
what is in the patient's best interests, at the expense of the patient's individual rights and
autonomy. This is exactly what the PPPR Act aimed to avoid.
B The Right to Die
Consideration of the right or wish to live naturally leads to the question of the right to
die. Judge MacCormick stated that he may not have granted the order had CMC not
expressed a wish to live. What is the position if she had actually expressed a wish to die?
8 4 Above n 63.
85 [1996] NZFLR 359.
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It is recognised that the state has an interest in the prevention of suicide.86 This is
related to its interest in preserving life. It follows from this that the imposition of medical
treatment without the patient's consent may be justified if the patient has done something in
an apparent attempt to kill herself. and the treatment is to avert the consequences of that
action.87 This is clearly the case if the suicide attempt is the result of mental illness or other
temporary incapacity. In CMC's case, if she had expressed a wish to die, this would
probably have been overridden because of her mental illness.
The difficulty in cases where the patient is competent is to distinguish a suicide attempt
from an exercise of the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. It may be that refusing
treatment is simply a decision to let the illness run its natural course. The House of Lords
has held that a decision to refuse treatment, even treatment prolonging life, is not suicide.88
In many cases of refusal of life-saving treatment, there is no issue of suicide because the
patient has no specific intent to die.89 For example, a Jehovah's Witness who refuses a life-
saving blood transfusion does so out of faith. Her attitude is that whether she dies is God's
decision. So in Re L Lord Donaldson described the case as not about the right to die, but
the right to choose how to live.90 In Home Secretary u Robb,91 Thorpe J held that a hunger
striking prisoner was not committing suicide. He was simply refusing to be fed.
With anorexia, there is similarly no question of suicide because anorexic patients
generally do not want to die.92 Indeed, Judge MacCormick held that CMC did not even
believe or accept that she might die. The typical anorexic patient refuses to eat from fear of
gaining weight, not in a deliberate attempt to kill herself. So the forced feeding of an
anorexic patient cannot be justified on the ground of preventing suicide.
C CMC's Family
As well as CMC's wish to live, Judge MacCormick noted her wish to live with her
family and in particular her children. He stated that it may have been appropriate to
decline to make the order had she not expressed this wish. It is obvious that the decision
would affect her husband and children. Her husband was the applicant, who had brought
86 Above n 83.
87 PDG Skegg Law, Ethics and Medicine (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 110.
88 Above n 68.
89 Above n 83.
90 Above n 31, 786.
91 Above n 28, 682.
92 Jane Scott confirmed this.
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the application as a last resort, wanting to respect CMC's wishes but also wanting her to
recover. It was also in the children's interests that their mother should recover and be able
to care for them.
The difficulty is to find a legal basis on which the Judge can consider CMC's family
situation when deciding whether to give her medical treatment without her consent. The
PPPR Act does not expressly provide for the family's interests to be taken into account.
However, orders under the PPPR Act usually do involve the patient's family in some way. It
has been said that the main purpose of proceedings under the Act is often to permit families
to act in ways that would otherwise be prevented by the incapacity of the patient.93
Judgments under the Act usually mention the family in some aspect, In Re W,94 the judge
mentioned W's family, stated that they had been consulted as much as possible, and that they
supported the proposed treatment. The order for W's treatment was granted. In In the
matter of IMT:5 the judge mentioned that the family were familiar with the proposed
treatment and were keen for it to continue. The order for IMT's treatment was granted. In
Re S,96 the order for treatment was not granted since although S was incompetent, the
proposed treatment was not the least restrictive possible. The judge stated that S's mother
did not consent to the proposed treatment, and that she had taken him to a Maori herbalist.
The foregoing cases involved patients who were incompetent to consent, but in none of
them was the patient actually refusing consent. It is a different matter to invoke the interests
of a patient's family members to justify imposing medical treatment in the face of the patient's
refusal.
Another possible basis for considering CMC's family is the State interest in protecting
innocent third parties. In the United States, this interest has been recognised as one that can
outweigh a competent individual's right to refuse treatment.w On this view, CMC's children
can be seen as innocent third parties who will be harmed by her decision to refuse
treatment.
In the United States, most of the cases on this subject involve the protection of unborn
children when their mothers refuse to undergo Caesarean births for religious reasons. In
93 Above n 21, 51.
94 Above n 63,576.
95 Above n 62, 613.
9 6 [1992] NZFLR 208.
97 Above n 83.
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one case,s the competent mother was ordered to undergo the Caesarean where the chances
of survival through natural birth were very small, and the chances through Caesarean birth
were good. The basis of these decisions is the entitlement of the unborn child to the law's
protection. This was found to outweigh the mother's right to refuse treatment.
The only English case is Re S,99 a recent case in the Family Division. In Re S, the
competent mother refused a Caesarean for religious reasons and the operation was ordered
because of the danger to mother and child from natural birth. The judgment was very short
due to the urgency of the case. The reasons for the decision were not given in any detail,
although the judge purported to rely on the American cases.
100
The decision in Re S is highly controversial and has been criticised by commentators.101
One problem with the decision is that English courts have never recognised that any state
interest can outweigh a competent person's right to refuse medical treatment. Another
problem is that English law does not recognise an unborn child as having any legal
existence.102
Despite criticism of Re S, it may be that the idea of protection of innocent third parties is
applied, but more conservatively than in the United States. In the 1995 case of Home
Secretaryu Robb,103 Thorpe J of the Family Division stated that:104
The consideration of protecting innocent third parties is one that is undoubtedly recognised in
this jurisdiction, as is evidenced by the decision of Stephen Brown P in Re S....It seems to me
that within this jurisdiction there is perhaps a stronger emphasis on the right of the
individual's self-determination when balance comes to be struck between that right and any
countervailing state interests.
Even if this interest is to be recognised, it would probably be limited to situations where
the life of the innocent third party is in danger. CMC's children were not in any physical
danger, they simply stood to lose someone who played a large part in their lives emotionally
and financially. There is some American case law which suggests that a parent's
98 R¥erson v Gr#in Spalding County Hospital Authority 274 SE 2d 457 (1981).
99 [1992] 3 WLR 806.
100 Above n 99, 807.
101 B Hewson "Ethical Triumph, or Surgical Rape?" (1993) 137 Sol J 1182; J Bridgeman "Medical
Treatment : the Mother's Rights" [1993] Family Law 534.
102 In re F (in utero) [1988] 2 WLR 1288.
103 Above n 28.
104 Above n 28,682, emphasis added.
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responsibility to her child may justify overriding her refusal of medical treatment.105 It is a
huge step however, from the protection of the child's life to the protection of his or her
general welfare.
It seems that the only legitimate basis for considering CMC's family is as part of CMC's
wishes for her future life. In this way, the Judge is simply giving effect to her expressed wish
to have a life with her children. This shows a respect for autonomy which is in line with
the philosophy of the PPPR Act.
V CONCLUSION
On the facts of Re CMC Judge MacCormick's decision is clearly the correct one. CMC
would die without treatment, and her mental illness rendered her not competent to refuse
that treatment. Anorexia nervosa affects a large number of women, although Re CMC was
the first reported case to consider it. It may be that in these kind of cases, the court is in the
end, forced to follow its conscience.
105 The Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc (1964) 331 F2d 1000. Kennedy
and Grubb, above n 14, 358, suggest that this case was really a situation of lack of competence.
